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IPv6―Say That Three Times Fast!
Internet protocol version 6 (IPv6), like its predecessor IPv4, is an Internet “addressing mechanism that defines how
and where information such as text, voice, and video move across interconnect networks.”316 Its developers designed it “to
increase the amount of available IP [Internet protocol] address space.”317 While recognizing that “transition is already
underway” largely because IPv6 can greatly increase address space, the GAO also cautioned agencies that IPv6 can
“introduce additional security risks,” such as unauthorized traffic and more direct access from the Internet.318 Fortunately,
the DOD appears ahead of other agencies in planning for the transition to this updated Internet protocol.319
Who Let the Data Out?
In July 2005, the GAO strongly criticized the federal government for a general lack of IT security.320 Using
sweeping language, the GAO castigated executive branch agencies for “[p]ervasive weaknesses in . . . information security
policies and practices [that] threaten the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of federal information and information
systems” and that “put federal operations and assets at risk of fraud, misuse, and destruction.”321 Though the report
acknowledges that “the government is making progress in its implementation of FISMA,” it nonetheless asserts that agency
weaknesses “place financial data at risk of unauthorized modification or destruction, sensitive information at risk of
inappropriate disclosure, and critical operations at risk of disruption.”322 If the IT sky really is falling across the government,
at least it’s falling everywhere―the report attributes “pervasive weaknesses” to “24 major agencies.”323 Unfortunately, the
report doesn’t address reactions from those twenty-four agencies to these allegations. However, it does include a two-page
letter from the OMB disagreeing with several GAO suggestions for the OMB,324 as well as a two-page GAO response.325
Lieutenant Colonel John J. Siemietkowski
Intellectual Property
Trade Secrets and the Federal Tort Claims Act
In Jerome Stevens Pharmaceuticals v. Food & Drug Admin,326 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that a contactor may sue the federal government for wrongful disclosure of trade secrets under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA).327 Although Jerome Stevens is not the first case to have such a holding,328 it is the only case disposing of the
issue as to whether disclosure of trade secrets is a discretionary function of a federal agency.329 In the opinion, the court
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states "[t]he parties appear to agree that the disclosure of trade secrets is not a discretionary function because federal law
prohibits it. "330 In addition, the court found that wrongful disclosure of a trade secret did not fall under the intentional tort
exception of the FTCA.
The FTCA grants federal district courts jurisdiction over claims arising from certain torts committed by federal
employees in the scope of their employment, and waives the government's sovereign immunity from such claims.'331 Two
important exceptions to jurisdiction and the waiver of sovereign immunity are relevant here: the discretionary function
exception and the intentional tort exception.332 The discretionary function exception prohibits claims “based upon the
exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion, involved is abused.”333 The intentional tort exception prohibits
“[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference with contract rights.”334
In Jerome Stevens, the court did not ask whether the wrongful disclosure of a trade secret fell within the
discretionary function exception. The court simply concluded that the parties seemed to agree that the discretionary function
exception did not apply because federal law prohibits disclosing trade secrets.335
As for the second exception, the "district court treated [plaintiff's] claims of misappropriation of trade secrets and
breach of a confidential relationship as a claim of interference with contract rights,"336 which the intentional tort exception
bars.337 On appeal, the DC Circuit disagreed finding that the duties underlying such claims are different.338 Unlike wrongful
disclosure of trade secrets, claims regarding intentional interference with contracts involve an economic relationship with a
third party.339 Consequently, the court narrowly construed the intentional tort exception to “those circumstances [that] are
within the words and reason of the exception”—no less and no more.340
After Jerome Stevens, it appears that tort relief is available to contractors when the government misappropriates or
wrongfully discloses trade secrets.
DD Form 882 over Substance: Caveat Forfeiture
In a case of first impression, the CAFC, in Campbell Plastics Engineering & Manufacturing v. Brownlee,341 held
that the government may obtain title to the subject invention342 where a contractor fails to comply with FAR invention
disclosure requirements set forth in the contract. Harm to the government is not required in order for the contracting
officer343 to remain within the bounds of sound discretion in demanding forfeiture. 344
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Campbell Plastics, a § 8(a) contractor, entered into a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract with the Army to develop
components of an aircrew protective mask. Section I of the contract incorporated by reference the FAR Clause 52.227-11,
Patent Rights-Retention by the Contractor. This clause "requires a contractor to disclose any subject invention developed
pursuant to a [G]overnment contract and sets forth certain substantive requirements for doing so."345 This clause allows the
government to "obtain title if the contractor fails to disclose the invention within two months from the date upon which the
inventor discloses it in writing to contractor personnel responsible for patent matters."346
Section I of the contract also incorporated by reference DFARS Clause 252.227-7039, Patents-Reporting of Subject
Inventions, "which requires the contractor to disclose subject inventions in interim reports furnished" periodically.347 Most
importantly, to report on inventions and subcontracts, the contractor was required to submit a Department of Defense (DD)
Form 882. Although the contractor failed, repeatedly, to disclose any subject inventions on the DD Form 882, contractor
disclosed all technical aspects of the invention to the Army.348 The Army even admitted that it possessed an enabling
disclosure of the invention.349 Technically, however, the contractor did not comply with the contract requirement that the
subject invention be disclosed on DD Form 882.
At the ASBCA, contractor argued that its failure to comply with the contract requirement was in "form only" and
should not result in title forfeiture.350 The ASBCA denied contractor's appeal ruling that contractor "failed to satisfy its
contractual obligation"351to properly inform the Army of the subject invention. Although the Army eventually found out
about the subject invention, this was only discovered from "its review of the patent application for secrecy determination
purposes and its own June 1997 report," which contractor did not supply.352 Finally, the board held that FAR 52.227-11(d)
allows the government to obtain title to a subject invention and the contracting officer in this case did not abuse his discretion
in doing so.353 Consequently, the contractor appealed.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the ASBCA.354 The court focused on the purpose behind requiring disclosure of
subject inventions to the government within a reasonable time after it has become known to contractor personnel:
Though the [Bayh-Dole] Act provides nonprofit organizations and small business firms the right to elect
title to a subject invention, it also vests in the [G]overnment the right to a paid-up license to practice the
invention when the contractor elects to retain title..., and the right to receive title to the invention in the
United Stated or any other country in which the contractor has not filed a patent application on the
invention prior to any pertinent statutory bar date.355
In other words, the disclosure provisions ensure that the government has sufficient measures to protect its own
rights. The court found that the contract was clear in that it required the contractor disclose subject inventions on the DD
Form 882. The court was unsympathetic to contractor's argument that the Army had knowledge of the substance of the
invention. The court said that the requirement to have the disclosure on an "easily identified form . . . is sound and needs to
be strictly enforced."356 Without rigid application of the rule, the government would never be sure of which piece of paper or
oral statement might comprise the subject invention disclosure.357
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Arguing that forfeiture is disfavored by common law, the contractor asserted that the contracting officer abused his
discretion in insisting on forfeiture when the government is not benefited in any way by such a decision.358 The Federal
Circuit agreed with the ASBCA to apply the four-prong abuse of discretion test of McDonnell Douglas Corporation v.
United States by looking at: 359
evidence of whether the government official acted with subject bad faith; (2) whether the official had a
reasonable, contract-related basis for his decision; (3) the amount of discretion given to the official; and (4)
whether the official violated a statute or regulation.
The CAFC agreed with the board’s finding that the contracting officer did not abuse his discretion. Commentators
have disagreed with the outcome of this case, specifically criticizing the use of the McDonnell Douglas test in ascertaining
abuse of discretion.360 In that case, a review of the factors the contracting officer actually considered occurred.361 Here, the
ASBCA's decision does not demonstrate that such a review happened.362
In conclusion, Campbell Plastics makes it clear that contractors must strictly comply with subject invention
disclosure requirements found in government contracts to avoid forfeiture to title of invention. It is now abundantly clear that
form, more specifically DD Form 882, triumphs over substance.
Major Katherine E. White
Non-FAR Transactions
DOD Issues Interim Rule Regarding Other Transaction Agreements
In last year’s Year in Review, we discussed the DOD’s latest regulatory changes to its authority to enter into
agreements that “do not comply with the normal statutory and regulatory contracting rules.”363 The Secretary of Defense and
the Secretaries of the military departments have the authority to enter into non-traditional binding agreements for the purpose
of research under two separate statutes.364 Title 10, Section 2358, permits the DOD to utilize grants and cooperative
agreements for research purposes.365 Additionally, Title 10, Section 2371, permits the DOD to enter into agreements “other
than contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements” for the purpose of research; these agreements are called other transaction
agreements (OTAs).366
While the original OTA legislation did not allow a contractor performing the research to produce the item it
researched,367 a 1993 amendment allowed that contractor to produce prototypes derived from the research.368 Later, a 2001
amendment allowed the DOD to award a follow-on production contract, without competition, to the contractor that had
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